Working Paper · Finance · Asset Pricing · CRSP 1926–2025

One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets

Long-run equity returns, shareholder wealth creation, and concentration in the U.S. public markets
AuthorHendrik Bessembinder
AffiliationW. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University
Initial DraftMarch 18, 2026
Sample29,754 common stocks · 29,081 firms
DatabaseCRSP CIZ · Jan 1926 – Dec 2025
↗ Full paper on SSRN
§ 1 · Abstract

Overview

This study summarizes investment outcomes for 29,754 common stocks listed in the public U.S. stock markets over the 100-year period from 1926 to 2025, reporting on both compound (buy-and-hold) percentage returns and shareholder wealth enhancement measured in dollars. While the cross-stock mean buy-and-hold return is over 30,000%, the median is −6.9%. Shareholders' wealth was enhanced by $91 trillion over the century, but long-term investors in nearly 60% of stocks incurred wealth reductions. The degree to which wealth creation is concentrated in a few firms has increased sharply in recent years. Over the 1926 to 2016 period studied in Bessembinder (2018), 89 firms accounted for half of the $43 trillion in net wealth creation. After including outcomes for the most recent nine years, just 46 firms account for half of the $91 trillion in net wealth creation over the full century.
Source: Abstract, Bessembinder (2026). Reproduced verbatim.
§ 2 · Key Results

Central Empirical Findings

All figures are reported directly in the paper. Each corresponds to a primary empirical result from Sections 2–3 or Table 7.

Result 01
$91T
Net shareholder wealth creation above the T-bill benchmark, measured as of December 2025, summed across all 29,081 sample firms over the full century.
Result 02
−6.9%
Median buy-and-hold return across individual stocks. Only 48.2% generated a positive return. The mean — 30,621% — is driven by extreme performers in the right tail.
Result 03
59.1%
Share of firms that reduced shareholder wealth relative to T-bills. The overall market's success was attributable to outcomes in a small fraction of firms.
Result 04
3.72%
Share of firms (1,082 out of 29,081) that account for 100% of net SWC. The remaining 96.3% collectively match Treasury-bill returns in aggregate.
Result 05
46
Firms accounting for 50% of all net SWC over the full century — down from 89 firms in the 1926–2016 sub-period, reflecting sharply increased concentration.
Result 06
6.81%
Ex-post annualized risk premium for the value-weighted U.S. stock market over the century: 10.1% stock return vs. 3.3% T-bill return (both geometric means).
Source: Abstract and Sections 2–3, Bessembinder (2026)
§ 3 · Return Distribution

Positive Skewness and the Mean–Median Gap

A structural feature of long-run equity returns is strong positive skewness. Compounding amplifies this asymmetry: losses are bounded at −100% (limited liability), while gains face no upper ceiling. Over long horizons, most individual stocks underperform the mean, and the mean itself far exceeds the median.

"Positive skewness arises in part because there is no ceiling on the potential magnitude of positive returns, while as long as legal systems incorporate limited liability, no return can be less than −100%." — Bessembinder (2026), Section 2
VW market
100-yr compound
1,504,057%
Mean BHR
cross-stock
30,621%
T-bill
100-yr compound
2,434%
Median BHR
cross-stock
−6.87%
Note: bars reflect proportional magnitudes relative to the value-weighted market return (set as reference). T-bill and median bars are not to literal scale. All figures source-exact from Section 2, Bessembinder (2026). The contrast is illustrative of the skewness documented in the paper.
Share of Stocks Exceeding Return Benchmarks (Full 1926–2025 Sample)
Source-exact figures. Section 2, Bessembinder (2026).
Source: Section 2, Bessembinder (2026)
§ 4 · The Power of Compounding

Modest Rates, Long Horizons: The Altria–Vulcan Comparison

Among the top-30 cumulative performers (Table 1), the median annualized return is just 13.02% and the mean is 13.00% — moderate by most standards. What differentiates these stocks is duration: their average listing period is 93.9 years. The Altria/Vulcan comparison, drawn directly from the paper, illustrates the non-linear force of compounding with particular clarity.

Both firms were listed for the full 100 years. Altria's annualized return is 1.18× Vulcan's. Its cumulative return is 8.81× larger.

Altria Group Inc.
Jan 1926 – Dec 2025 · 100 years
Annualized compound return16.53%
Cumulative gross wealth / $1$4,421,136
Highest cumulative return in the full 100-year CRSP sample.
Vulcan Materials Co.
Jan 1926 – Dec 2025 · 100 years
Annualized compound return14.03%
Cumulative gross wealth / $1$501,591
Annualized return is 1.18× lower; cumulative return is 8.81× lower.
"The data reported in Table 1 support the relevance of the adage focused on the importance of 'time in the market.'" — Bessembinder (2026), Section 2
Rate Ratio vs. Cumulative Outcome Ratio: Altria / Vulcan Materials
A 1.18× difference in annualized return produces an 8.81× difference in cumulative outcome over 100 years. Source-exact figures from Table 1, Bessembinder (2026).
Source: Table 1 and Section 2, Bessembinder (2026). Figures source-exact.
§ 5 · Wealth Tiers

Three Tiers: Destroyers, Offsetters, Net Creators

Section 3 provides a precise decomposition of the 29,081 sample firms. The structure is striking: 59.1% of firms destroy wealth, a further 37.2% generate positive SWC only sufficient to offset that destruction, and the remaining 3.7% — 1,082 firms — generate all $91 trillion of net SWC.

0 firms← 59.1% →← 37.1% →← 3.7% →
17,197 firms (59.13%) — Reduced shareholder wealth vs. the T-bill benchmark. Aggregate wealth destruction: −$10.67 trillion.
10,802 firms (37.15%) — Generated positive SWC, but only sufficient to offset the above destruction. Together with destroyers, these 27,999 firms sum to zero net SWC.
1,082 firms (3.72%) — Accounted for 100% of the $90.96 trillion in net SWC. The entirety of long-run market outperformance over T-bills originates in this group.
Strip widths are proportional to firm counts (source-exact). Source: Section 3 and Table 7, Bessembinder (2026).
§ 6 · Concentration of SWC

Fewer Firms, More Wealth: Concentration Has Intensified

Table 7 reports the number of firms required to account for 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% of net SWC across three periods. The results document a sharp increase in concentration between the 1926–2016 period and the updated sample through 2025.

Full century · 1926–2025
46
firms account for 50% of net SWC, out of 29,081 total (0.16% of all listed firms)
Net SWC: $90.96 trillion
Bessembinder (2018) period · 1926–2016
89
firms account for 50% of net SWC, out of 25,383 total (0.35% of all listed firms)
Net SWC: $42.61 trillion
Recent period · 2017–2025
13
firms account for 50% of net SWC, out of 7,820 total (0.17% of all listed firms)
Net SWC: $48.36 trillion
Source: Table 7, Bessembinder (2026). All figures source-exact.
Firms Required to Reach SWC Thresholds, by Period
Log scale on y-axis. Source-exact data from Table 7, Bessembinder (2026).
Source: Table 7, Bessembinder (2026)

The 2017–2025 sub-period generated $48.36 trillion in net SWC — nearly as much as the preceding nine decades combined — with just 13 firms accounting for half of that total. The top 30 firms in that sub-period account for 61.2% of post-2016 net SWC, compared to 31.1% for the equivalent group over 1926–2016. Nvidia alone represents 9.32% of post-2016 net SWC; the comparable figure for the top 2016 firm (Exxon Mobil) was 2.89%.

Source: Tables 6–7 and Section 3, Bessembinder (2026)
§ 7 · Top Wealth Creators — SWC

Thirty Firms with Largest Shareholder Wealth Creation, 1926–2025

Reproduced from Table 5 of the paper. SWC is stated in millions of 2025 dollars, measured in excess of the T-bill benchmark. The top five firms alone — Apple, Nvidia, Microsoft, Alphabet, and Amazon — account for 21.4% of the $91 trillion total.

# Company SWC ($M) % of Total Cumul. % First Last
Source: Table 5, Bessembinder (2026). All figures source-exact. SWC measured as of December 31, 2025.
§ 8 · Top Cumulative Returns — BHR

Thirty Stocks with Highest Cumulative Buy-and-Hold Returns, 1926–2025

Reproduced from Table 1 of the paper. The key finding is that extreme cumulative outcomes are produced not by extraordinary annualized rates, but by moderate rates sustained over very long listing periods, averaging 93.9 years among the top 30. The median annualized return in this group is 13.02%; the highest is 16.53% (Altria). Hover over the annualized return chart below for firm-level detail.

# Company Cum. Wealth / $1 Annual. Return First Last Years
Source: Table 1, Bessembinder (2026). All figures source-exact.
Annualized Returns Among Top-30 Cumulative Performers (ranked by cumulative return)
Despite extreme cumulative outcomes, all annualized returns cluster between 11% and 17%. Median = 13.02%; Mean = 13.00%. Red bars = above 15%. Hover for firm name and years listed. Source: Table 1, Bessembinder (2026).
Source: Table 1, Bessembinder (2026). Figures source-exact.
§ 9 · Decade-Horizon Returns

What Share of Stocks Beat T-Bills Each Decade?

Table 3 reports decade-horizon buy-and-hold returns for each of the ten decades from 1926 to 2025. The figures below show the percentage of stocks that exceeded matched-period T-bill returns within each decade. Blue = majority beat T-bills; red = minority beat T-bills. A structural shift is apparent: the average across the first six decades was 61.2%; across the last four it fell to 47.9%.

Source: Table 3, Bessembinder (2026). All figures source-exact.
Median Decade Buy-and-Hold Return, by Decade
Navy = positive median; red = negative median. Note the contrast between the first four and last four decades. Source-exact data from Table 3, Bessembinder (2026).
Source: Table 3, Bessembinder (2026)

The median decade-horizon return averaged 63.6% across the first six decades versus 5.8% across the most recent four — despite strong value-weighted market performance from 1986 to 2025. The authors attribute this partly to the surge in listings of younger, smaller companies during the 1970s and 1980s, many of which did not survive, documented by Fama and French (2004).

Source: Section 2, Bessembinder (2026)
§ 10 · Reference and Access

Full Citation

Working Paper
Bessembinder, H. (2026). One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets. W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. Initial draft: March 18, 2026.

Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6438198

Related earlier study: Bessembinder, H. (2018). Do stocks outperform Treasury bills? Journal of Financial Economics 129, 440–457.

This page is a research companion to the working paper cited above. It has no affiliation with the author or Arizona State University. All numerical claims are drawn directly from the paper as cited; no figure is approximated without explicit labeling. Readers are directed to the full paper for methodological detail, including the formal SWC computation in the Appendix.

Data source: CRSP monthly stock return database, CIZ version, January 1926 – December 2025. Treasury-bill data supplement Professor Kenneth French's series with SBBI data for January–June 1926.